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European Community Competition Law, Subsidiarity, 
and the National Courts 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the modern European integration movement has 
emphasized the unrestricted movement of goods and services 1 and has 
discouraged restrictions on competition within the common market? As a 
result, a large and complex body of law relating to competition in what is 
now the European Union (EU) has accumulated over the past four 
decades. 3 This law is based on treaties, legislative acts and decisions, and 
judicial pronouncements at both the EU and Member State levels. This 
comment will not give a complete and comprehensive reading of Euro-
pean Community (EC) competition law. Rather, it will provide a basic 
understanding of current competition law, including developments after 
the signing of of the Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht 
Treaty). 
In the first part of this comment, the historical development of mod-
em EC competition policy and law is briefly examined. EC competition 
law as articulated by Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty4 is then 
discussed. Some recent developments in the law in this area are also ana-
lyzed. The concept of "subsidiarity" and the effect it has had on EC com-
I. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 25 March 1957, art. 3(c) 
[hereinafter EC TREATY] in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS 222 (Bernard Rudden & Denick Wyatt eds., 
6th ed. 1996) (hereinafter BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS). 
2. Competition law in the European Union is roughly analogous to anti-trust law in the 
United States. See Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insights from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and 
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for European Union 
Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 559 (1995). 
3. A number of legal scholars have written comprehensive works on European Community 
competition law. See, e.g., VALENTINE KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (5th ed. 
1994 ); LUIS ORITZ BLANCO, EC COMPETITION PROCEDURE (1995). For a discussion of recent 
developments and case-law in EC competition law, see Jean-Yves Art & Dirk Liedekerke, 
Developments in EC Competition Law in 1994-An Overview, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 921 
(1995); Jean-Yves Art & Dirk Liedekerke, Developments in EC Competition Law in 1995-An 
Overview. 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 719 (1996); Jo Shaw, A review of recent cases on Article 
85 and 86 EC: issues of substantive law, 20 EUR. L. REV. 66 (1995). 
4. With entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the EEC Treaty became 
the EC Treaty. For the purpose of this comment I use the term "EEC" to refer to the Treaty in the 
pre-Maastricht period and the tenn "EC" to refer to the post-Maasuicht period. The terms EC 
(European Community) and EU (European Union) are used in accordance with the explanation in 
Note on Post-Maastricht Terminology, 1 C.M.L.R. 4 (1994). Therefore, the term EU generally 
applies to the European political entity, while EC generally refers to the legal entity or the central 
pillar within the EU. 
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petition law is also discussed, with primary focus on the concept of 
subsidiarity as embodied in the Commission's 1993 Notice on Coopera-
tion Between National Courts and the Commission in applying Articles 
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.5 Finally, a British case, lnntrepreneur Es-
tates Ltd. v. Mason,6 is highlighted. This case exemplifies the interaction 
between the Commission and national courts regarding competition law. 
It also illuminates the application of the 1993 Notice by a national court. 
In conclusion, the importance of the role that national courts will play in 
the implementation and development of future competition law in the Eu-
ropean Union is discussed. 
II. COMPETITION LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
After the carnage of World War II, support for European integration 
accelerated and eventually led to the formation of what has come to be 
known as the European Union.7 In fact, the theoretical objective of the 
European Union's founders, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, was to 
inextricably bind the economies of Europe together (primarily Germany 
and France) in order to discourage Member States from warring among 
themselves.8 The formation of a common market manifested this objec-
tive, as evidenced by the treaties founding the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC),9 the European Economic Community (EEC, now 
EC), 10 and the European Atomic Energy Authority (Euratom). 11 
The EC Treaty notes that in order to form a common market, the 
Member States must "[r]ecogni[ze] that the removal of existing obstacles 
calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, 
balanced trade and fair competition." 12 Under the Treaty of Rome, this 
critical common market objective was to be accomplished by allowing 
5. Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in Applying 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 O.J. (C 39) 6 in BLANCO, supra note 3, at 454 
[hereinafter Notice]. 
6. lnntrepreneur Estates Ud. v. Mason, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 293 (High Court (Q.B.)) (UK.). 
7. At the time of this writing, the European Union consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
8. NEill NUGENT, THE GoVERNMENT AND POLfriCS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 38 (3d ed 
1994); see also DAVID W. P. LEWIS, THE ROAD TO EUROPE (1993); Joseph H. H. Weiler, The 
Transfornwtion of Europe, I 00 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991 ). 
9. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, 18 April 1951. 
[hereinafter ECSC TREATY] in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note!, at 7. 
10. EC TREATY (also referred to as the Treaty of Rome). 
II. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, 25 March 1957, 
[hereinafter EURATOM TREATY] in Encyclopedia of Eur. Community L. (Sweet & Maxwell) Part 
B5, at BS-001 (Nov. 30, 1993). 
12. EC TREATY preamble. 
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the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. 13 Article 3(f) 
of the Treaty called for the "institution of a system ensuring that competi-
tion in the common market is not distorted .... "14 The natural outgrowth 
of this objective was the formation of a consistent, Community-wide 
competition policy. 
European Community competition law was first articulated in 19 51, 
with the adoption of the ECSC Treaty. 15 It established the foundation 
upon which EC competition law and policy would be built. Under the 
ECSC provisions, Member States were prohibited from restricting the 
coal and steel sectors by initiating either: 
a) import and export duties, or charges having equivalent effect, and 
quantitative restrictions on the movement of products; 
b) measures or practices which discriminate between producers, 
between purchasers or between consumers .... 16 
The development of competition law and policy was further emphasized 
in the Spaak Report which would become the precursor to the EEC 
Treaty. The Spaak Report found that a common market could not be ob-
tained "unless practices whereby competition between producers is dis-
torted [were] put to an end."17 The Report further stated that to achieve 
the objectives of the common market, Member States would have to pre-
vent "[a] division of markets by agreement between enterprises[,] ... 
[a]greements to limit production or curb technical progress[, and] ... [t]he 
absorption or domination of the market for a product by a single enter-
prise .... "18 
The sectoral application of competition rules was expanded beyond 
the coal and steel sectors with the entry into force of the EEC Treaty19 in 
1958. The EEC Treaty set specified guidelines pertaining to competition 
in the newly formed Community. In particular, Articles 85 and 86 estab-
lished the general parameters within which the EC's competition law and 
policy would occur. 20 
13. /d. at art. 3. 
14. /d. (This Article wa.~ originally 3(f) of the EEC Treaty but now with entry into force 
of the TEU is Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty. I refer to it as Article 3(f) for the purposes of this 
comment.) 
15. The original Member States of the ECSC were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
16. ECSC TREATI art. 4. See Mark Friend, Enforcing the ECSC Treaty in national courts, 
20 EUR. L. REV. 58 (1995). 
17. DANIEL G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW 25 (2d ed. 1993). 
18. /d. at 25. 
19. The EC-6 consisted of the same Member States as the ECSC. See supra note 15. 
20. Articles 85-94 of the EC Treaty provide the governing EU provisions dealing with 
competition. Articles 85 to 90 deal with "rules applying to undertakings." Articles 90-94 deal with 
"aids granted by States." This comment, however, will deal only with Articles 85 and 86. 
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A. EC Treaty Article 85 
Article 85(1) deals with undertakings,21 decisions by associations of 
undertakings, and concerted practices. It is crafted as follows: 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .... 22 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty gives specific examples of conduct which vio-
lates the competition rules.23 Moreover, Article 85(2) states that "any 
agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be auto-
matically void."24 Article 85(3), however, provides exemptions from the 
prohibitions contained in Article 85(1). Specifically exempted are: 
[A]ny agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; any 
decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; any 
concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes 
to improving the production of distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit .... 25 
Such exemption may not, however, "impose on the undertakings 
concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives" or "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminat-
21. Valentine Korah states that an "[u]ndertaking is a broad concept which seems to have the 
same meaning in articles 85 [and] 86 .... [It] covers any collection of resources to carry out economic 
activities." KORAH, supra note 3, at 38. 
22. EC TREATY art. 85(1). 
23. In particular the Article mentions those agreements, decisions, and concerted practices 
which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
!d. at art. 85(1 ). 
24. /d. at art. 85(2). 
25. /d. at art. 85(3). 
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ing competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in ques-
tion."26 
Article 85(1) applies to agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices. Horizontal27 as 
well as vertical28 agreements are subject to this Article. Its purpose is to 
generally prohibit agreements, decisions or concerted practices which 
"have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market."29 The primary emphasis in ap-
plying Article 85(1) is upon an agreement, decision or concerted practice 
and its effect upon trade in the Community. However, Article 85(1) only 
applies to agreements, decisions or concerted practices which affect trade 
between Member States. 30 Therefore, agreements, decisions or concerted 
practices whose object and effect may be discriminatory but which do not 
have Community-wide influence may not be subject to Article 85(1).31 
Also, unilateral actions may not be subject to Article 85(1), as it applies 
only to agreements between undertakings, associations of undertakings, 
and concerted practices.32 Such actions could, however, constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position, subject to the prohibitions of Article 86. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that the effect of a re-
straint on competition must be "appreciable.'m This is known as the de 
minimus rule. In its Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance,34 the 
European Commission has further defined the de minimus rule. The 
Commission stated that in its opinion, "agreements whose effects on trade 
between Member States or on competition are negligible do not fall under 
the ban on restrictive agreements contained in Article 85(1).''35 The Com-
mission further stated that for the de minimus rule to apply, "the goods or 
services which are the subject of the agreement ... [may] not represent 
26. EC TREATY art. 85(3). 
27. Horizontal agreements are agreements between undertakings doing business at the same 
level. See BELlAMY & CHILD: COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 66 § 2-059 (Vivien Rose 
ed., 4th ed. 1993). 
28. Vertical agreements are agreements between manufacturers and their distributors. See 
id. at 66 § 2-058. 
29. EC TREATY art. 85(1). See Barry E. Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints & EC 
Competition Law, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 973 (1995). 
30. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 1 
C.M.L.R. 418 (1966). 
31. The Republic v. Jean Edmond Teil, 1 C.M.L.R. 593 (Cass. 1993) (Fr.); The State v. 
Morais, 2 C.M.L.R. 533 (1992) (Port.). 
32. See KORAH, supra note 3, at 38-49. 
33. Case 5/69, Yolk v. Etablissements Vervaecke S.P.R.L., 1969 E.C.R. 295, 1 C.M.L.R. 
273 (1969). 
34. Commission Notice of September 3, 1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance Wh1ch 
Do Not Fall Under Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 
1986 OJ. (C 231) 2 in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 1, at 500. 
35. !d. at 2. See Morten P. Broberg, The De Minimus Notice, 20 EUR. L. REV. 371 (1995). 
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more than five per cent of the total market for such goods or services ... 
and the aggregate annual turnover of the participating undertakings [may] 
not exceed 200 million ECU (European Currency Unit)."36 
The agreements and decisions specifically listed in Article 85(1) are 
"automatically void" pursuant to Article 85(2). Provisions, however, 
which do not violate the prohibitions of Article 85(1) are not void and 
may be enforced. 37 Agreements or portions of agreements violative of 
Article 85(1) are unenforceable in the courts of Member States. However, 
those provisions of an agreement which are valid may be considered sub-
ject to the laws of the respective Member States. 38 Parties adversely af-
fected by the voided agreement may therefore seek damages for their in-
juries in the national courts. 
If an agreement, decision or concerted practice violates the prohibi-
tions of Article 85(1), it still may be exempted pursuant to Article 85(3). 
These exemptions are granted solely by the Commission and are subject 
to review by the EU courts. 39 An exemption can come in the form of ei-
ther an individual exemption or a group exemption. 
An individual exemption can be granted in one of two ways: the 
Commission will either grant negative clearance or make a declaration of 
inapplicability. A negative clearance is granted when the Commission 
issues a decision stating that it sees no reason, based on the facts in its 
possession, to take an action against the agreement, decision or concerted 
practice under Article 85(1).40 A declaration of inapplicability is an ad-
mission by the Commission that while a given agreement, decision or 
concerted practice violates the provisions of Article 85(1), the benefits 
provided by the agreement, decision or concerted practice outweigh any 
negative effects. 41 The Commission makes a declaration of inapplicability 
based on the criteria set out in Article 85(3). In either case, the 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices are received by the Commis-
sion so that third parties can be apprised of the application for exemption. 
A comfort letter may also be sent to the undertakings seeking an ex-
emption. The letter essentially tells the undertaking that based on facts in 
its possession, the Commission sees no grounds for an action against the 
agreement, decision or concerted practice. Comfort letters are issued 
36. !d. 
37. Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere v. Ma.•chinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 1 
C.M.L.R. 357 (1966). 
38. Case 127n3 B.R.T. v. S.A.B.A.M., 1974 E.C.R. 51, 2 C.M.L.R. 238 (1974). 
39. Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation Implementing Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-62 OJ. Spec. Ed. 87 as amended by Regulations 59 1959-62 OJ. 
Spec. Ed. 249, 118/63 1963-64 O.J. Spec. Ed. 55, 2822nl 1971 OJ. Spec. Ed. 1035 [hereinafter 
Regulation No. 17] in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 1, at 484. 
40. !d. at art. 2; see also GOYDER, supra note 17, at 37. 
41. See BLANCO, supra note 3, at 49-50. 
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more quickly than the other individual exemptions but their legal status is 
not as certain. 42 
Prior to 1965, the Commission only granted individual exemptions. 
However, group exemptions were adopted by Regulation 10/65 to limit 
the number of applications for individual exemptions. 43 Since then, group 
exemptions have become the preferred mode of exemption. As individual 
exemptions are rarely granted, most undertakings draft their agreements 
in accordance with the parameters articulated by the Commission in 
group exemptions. Examples of group exemptions which the Commission 
has granted include exclusive distribution agreements,44 exclusive pur-
chase agreements, 45 patent license agreements,46 exclusive motor vehicles 
distribution agreements,47 specialization agreements,48 research and de-
velopment agreements, 49 franchise agreements,50 and know-how license 
agrecments. 51 
B. EC Treaty Article 86 
Article 86 sets forth competition rules regarding the abuse of a domi-
nant position by undertakings. It is drafted as follows: 
42. See KORAH, supra note 3, at 115-16. 
43. See GOYDER, supra note 17, at 65-68. 
44. Council Regulation 1983/83 of 22 June 1993 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Tr.;aty to categories of exclusive distributic'n agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1 in BASIC 
COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 1, at 504. 
45. Conunission Regulation 1984/83 of 22 June 1993 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1 in BASIC 
COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 1, at 510. 
46. Conunission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing agreements in BASIC COMMUNffY LAWS 510 
(Bernard Rudden & Derrick Wyatt eds., 4th ed. 1993). 
47. Commission Regulation 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, 1984 0 . .1. 
(L 15) 16 in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS 509 (Bernard Rudden & Derrick Wyatt eds., 4th ed. 1993). 
48. Commission Regulation 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of specialisation agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1 as amended 
bv Commission Regulation 151/93 1993 OJ. (L 21) 8 in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 1, 
at 521. 
49. Commission Regulation 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of research and development agreements 1985 OJ. (L 53) 5 as 
amended by Conmlission Regulation 151/93 1993 O.J. (L 21) 8 in BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS, supra 
note I, at 528. 
50. Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 30 November 1984 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of franchise agreements, 1988 OJ. (L 359) 46 in BASIC 
COMMUNITY LAWS, supra note 1, at 540. 
51. Commission Regulation 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of know-how licensing agreements, 1989 OJ. (L 61) 1 
as amended by Conunission Regulation 151/93 1993 OJ. (L 21) 8 in BLANCO, supra note 3, at 
428. 
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Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States .... 52 
Article 86 also provides specific scenarios in which an abuse may oc-
cur.53 
While Articles 85 and 86 share the objective to prevent the distortion 
of competition within the Community, Article 86 is designed to apply to 
different situations than Article 85.54 While Article 85 deals with agree-
ments, decisions or concerted practices that involve two or more under-
takings, Article 86 may apply to only one undertaking. In fact, Article 86 
does not necessarily deal with agreements, decisions, or concerted prac-
tices as does Article 85. Rather, the touchstone of Article 86 is whether 
the undertaking (or group of under undertakings) occupies a dominant 
position and has abused that position. This does not mean, however, that 
Articles 85 and 86 are mutually exclusive. The primary purpose of Arti-
cle 8 6 is to prevent large companies from forming monopolies which 
would distort competition within the meaning of Article 3(f) of the EC 
Treaty.55 However, it is clear that Article 86 does not expressly prohibit 
dominance, but rather abuse of a dominant position. 56 This is an impor-
tant distinction. 
The ECJ has defined dominance as the power of an undertaking or 
group of undertakings which, "enables [them] to hinder the maintenance 
of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave 
to an appreciable extent independently if its competitors and customers 
and ultimately of consumers."57 The percentage of the market owned or 
controlled necessary to constitute a dominant position is not static. 
I d. 
52. EC TREATY art. 86. 
53. The Article mentions the following as abuse: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have not connection with the subject of such contracts. 
54. Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, 1990 II E.C.R. 3416, 4 C.M.L.R. 
334 (Ct. First Instance 1991). 
55. See supra note 14. 
56. Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 1 C.M.L.R. 282 (1985). 
57. ld. at 321. 
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Rather, it is dependant upon a number of factors including the relevant 
market and the percentage of market share relative to other competitors. 
The ECJ has found a dominant position in cases ranging from 90% mar-
ket share, 58 to only a 40-45% market share. 59 
Article 86 does not define abuse of a dominant position but it does 
give examples of such an abuse. The ECJ has further explained the mean-
ing of abuse within the context of Article 86 in Hoffman-La Roche: 
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of 
an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the un-
dertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through recourse to methods different from those which condition nor-
mal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions 
of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of 
the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of 
that competition.60 
As is the case with Article 85, a violation of Article 86 must neces-
sarily involve trade between Member States. Also, parties may seek nega-
tive clearance under Article 86 as with Article 85.61 The Commission's 
province is to enforce the provisions stated in Articles 85 and 86.62 The 
Commission may investigate possible infringements of its own accord or 
may respond to claims of violations by Member States.63 Pursuant to 
Regulation No. 17, the Commission has been granted the competence to 
set and levy fines against undertakings which have violated the provisions 
of Articles 85 and 86 and who do not qualify for an exemption. 64 
58. Tetra Pak, 1990 II E.C.R. 3416. 
59. Case 27176, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 1 C.M.L.R. 429 
(1978). 
60. Case 85176, Holiman-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 541, 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 
290-91 (1979). 
61. CHRL~TOPHER S. KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 49 § 2.04 (1994). 
62. Regulation No. 17, supra note 39, at art. 9. 
63. Jd. at art. 11. 
64. !d. at art. 15. 
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II. COMPETITION LAW, SUBSIDIARITY, AND THE NATIONAL COURTS 
A. Interaction With the National Courts 
While the Commission has been granted the sole competence to grant 
exemptions to Articles 85 and 86,65 it must share with the national courts 
in the Member States the power of determining which agreements, deci-
sions, and concerted practices have violated Articles 85 and 86. This is 
the result of the "direct effect" of Article 85(1 )and (2) and Article 86.66 
The concept of direct effect means that Article 85(1) and (2) and Article 
86 automatically have effect in the respective Member States and that 
citizens of those states can claim individual rights in the national courts 
pursuant to these Articles.67 Its application has resulted in the develop-
ment of an interesting enforcement burden-sharing partnership between 
the Commission and the national courts.68 
Article 177 of the EC Treaty provides additional interaction between 
the Member States and the EC institutions.69 This Article provides that 
the ECJ may "give preliminary rulings concerning ... the interpretation 
of this (EC) Treaty ... , the validity and interpretation of acts of the insti-
tutions of the community ... , [and] the interpretation of the statutes of 
bodies established by an act of the Council .... "70 Article 177 further 
states that "[ w ]here such a question is raised before any court or tribunal 
65. Regulation No. 17, supra note 39. Additionally, in Case 234/89 Stergios Delimitis v. 
Henninger Brau AG, 1991 E.C.R. 935, 5 C.M.L.R. 210 (1991), the ECJ made it clear that national 
courts did not have the authority to grant exemptions pursuant to Article 85(3) and that this 
competence was solely that of the Commission. 
66. See, e.g., Case 127173, B.R.T. v. S.A.B.A.M., 1974 E.C.R. 51, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238. 
67. Professor Trevor Hartley explains direct effect as follows: 
[l]f a legal provision is said to be directly effective, it is meant that it grants 
individuals rights which must be upheld by the national courts. . . . As a 
matter of general principle, a legal provision cannot be directly effective unless 
two requirements are satisfied. First of all, the provision ... must be valid 
from the point of view of the national courts .... The second requirement is 
that the terms of the provision must be appropriate to confer rights on 
individuals. 
TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 195-96 (3d ed. I 994 ). 
The seminal case on direct effect is Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie 
der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. I, I C.M.L.R. 105 (\963). 
68. See David F. Hall, Enforcement of E.C. Competition Law by National Courts, in 
PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE E.C. AND U.S. COMPETITION LAW 41-49 (Piet Jan Slot and 
Alison McDonnell eds., 1993); see also John Temple Lang, The Duties of National Courts under 
Community Law, 22 EUR. L. REv. 3 (1997). But see Rein Wesseling, Subsidiarity in Community 
Antitrust Law: Setting the Right Agenda, 22 EuR. L. REv. 35 (1997). 
69. Many competition cases also find their way to the ECJ or the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
pursuant to Articles 171 and 172 of the EC Treaty. These Articles allow the Courts to "review the 
legality" of the Commission's decisions and to exercise "unlimited jurisdiction" regarding penalties. 
70. EC TREATY art. 177. 
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of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a deci-
sion on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request 
the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.'m National courts may 
thereby seek a ruling from the ECJ on EC legal issues in order to give 
judgment.72 The ECJ, however, may not determine questions of fact and 
is allowed only to interpret the law. The practical application of Article 
177 to competition law is that a national court may stay its proceedings 
and seek a ruling from the ECJ on the interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 
as well as EC legislation. 
The direct effect of Articles 85 and 86, and the procedures allowed 
by Article 177, have created a high degree of interaction in the area of 
competition law between the Member States and the EC institutions. This 
relationship was strengthened by the inclusion of the concept of 
"subsidiarity" in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In particular, arti-
cle 3(b) mandates: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Commu-
nity shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.73 
Subsidiarity thus requires that actions shall be taken at the level most ap-
propriate to address the action in question. Therefore, the practical mean-
ing of subsidiarity is that excepting areas in which the EC has exclusive 
competence, actions will be taken at the Member State level.74 In the area 
of competition enforcement, Article 3(b) in some ways codifies and 
strengthens what has already been occurring to some extent for the past 
71. /d. at art. I 77. 
72. See Guidance on References by National Courts for Preliminary Rulings, I C.M.L.R. 
78 (1997); see also HARTLEY, supra note 66, at 266-302; DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 142-53 (3d ed. 1993). 
73. EC TREATY art. 3(b). 
74. See generally Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf?, in LEGAL ISSUES 
OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 65 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994); Daniel G. 
Partan, The Justiciability of Subsidiarity, in THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: BUILDING A 
EUROPEAN POLITY? 63 (Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia Mazey eds., 1995); Josephine Steiner, 
Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 49 (David 
O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994); Akos G. Toth, A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity, in 
LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 37 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994); 
Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 459 (1992); George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in 
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 33 I (1994); Eric F. Hinton, 
Note, The Limits of Affirmative Action in the European Union: Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming May I 997). 
312 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
three decades between the national courts and the EC institutions.75 How-
ever, subsidiarity also implies that even more competition cases should be 
heard in the national courts and that Commission competition decisions 
and Article 177 preliminary rulings requests should be reduced. It is 
therefore imperative that national courts have direction from the Commis-
sion on the application of Articles 85 and 86 in suits brought in the Mem-
ber States. 
B. The Commission's Notice on Cooperation with National Courts in 
Applying Article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
An important clarification for national courts came with the Commis-
sion's February 13, 1993 adoption of a Notice on Cooperation with Na-
tional Courts in Applying Article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.76 In that 
Notice, the Commission expressed its desire to cooperate with the na-
tional courts. It stated that, 
The Corrunission considers that such cooperation is essential in order to 
guarantee the strict, effective and consistent application of Community 
competition law. In addition, more effective participation by the na-
tional courts in the day-to-day application of competition law gives the 
Commission more time to perform its administrative task, namely to 
steer competition policy in the Community.77 
The Commission elaborated on the advantages that are the result of na-
tional courts' ability to hear competition complaints. Because of this 
competence, national courts are able to award damages for infringement 
of competition laws, adopt interim measures more quickly than the Com-
mission, hear claims under both EC and national competition laws, and 
award legal fees to successful applicants.78 
The Notice also sets forth guidelines to assist the national courts. Na-
tional courts must determine "whether the agreement, decision or con-
certed practice infringes the prohibitions laid down in Article 85(1) or 
75. Roger P. Alford, Subsidiarity and Competition: Decentralized Enforcement of EU 
Competition Laws, 27 CORNELL INf'L L.J. 271, 272 (1994). But see Alissa A. Meade, Note, 
Modeling a European Competition Authority, 46 DUKE L.J. 153, 154-55 (1996); Robert Walz, 
Rethinking Walt Wilhelm. or the Supremacy of Community Competition Law over National Law, 
21 EUR. L. REV. 449 (1996). 
76. Notice, supra note 5, at 6. For additional discussion of the Commission's Notice see, 
The Commission's Notice on Cooperation between National Courts and the Commission in 
applying Articles 85 and 86 EEC, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 681 (1993); Ian S. Forrester and 
Christopher NoraH, Competition Law, 12 Y.B. EUR. L. 547, 550-60 (1993); Jacques H. J. 
Bourgeois, EC Competition Law and Member State Courts, 17 FoRDHAM INf'L L.J. 331 (1994). 
77. Notice, supra note 5, at 10. 
78. Jd. at 7-8. 
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Article 86."79 This is to be done by "ascertain[ing] whether the 
agreement, decision or concerted practice has already been the subject of 
a decision by ... the Commission."80 While national courts may not be 
formally bound by such decisions, the Commission admonishes the na-
tional courts to use these statements in reaching a judgment. This is also 
the case with a comfort letter. 
If there has been no ruling by the Commission on the agreement, de-
cision or concerted practice, the national courts are instructed to use the 
case law of the ECJ and decisions of the Commission to interpret the law 
in question. 81 The Commission indicates that national court proceedings 
may be stayed in order to await the outcome of a Commission action. Fi-
nally, if national courts have "persistent doubts on questions of compati-
bility" they may bring the matter before the ECJ, pursuant to Article 177 
of the EC Treaty. 82 
C. An Application of the Commission's Notice: 
Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd. v. Mason 
Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd. v. Mason 83 provides an enlightening exam-
ple of a national court's application of the guidelines contained in the 
Commission's Notice regarding Articles 85 and 86. Importantly, 
Inntrepreneur was decided on March 11, 1993, less than a month after 
the adoption of the Notice. This case came as an interlocutory appeal be-
fore the Queen's Bench Division of the English High Court. At issue was 
Inntrepreneur Estates' (lnntrepreneur) claim for possession of certain 
premises leased by the Masons (Masons) for arrears of rent. 
The property was a public house containing a bar and other accom-
modations. A twenty year lease had been granted for the property. 84 Also 
included in the lease was a tie provision requiring the tenants to "pur-
chase beers and other drinks and products from the landlord or from a 
nominee of the landlord and not from anybody else. "85 The lease was 
subject to five yearly rent reviews. However, if the tenant was either en-
tirely or partially released from the tie provision, the landlord could exer-
cise the option of conducting another rent review in addition to the five 
yearly reviews. 
79. !d. at 8. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. 
82. Notice, J·upra note 5, at 8. 
83. Jmitrepreneur Estates Ltd. v. Mason, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 293 (High Court (Q.B.)) (U.K.). 
84. ld at 296. 
85. !d. 
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After a period of time as tenants, the Masons fell behind on their rent 
payments. 86 As a result, Inntrepreneur brought an action seeking posses-
sion of the premises and payment for back rent as well as other costs. The 
court entered a default judgment in behalf of Inntrepreneur. On appeal, 
however, the Master set aside the judgment against the Masons and 
Inntrepreneur appealed to the Queen's Bench. 87 
The Masons based their defense on Article 85 of the EC Treaty. They 
alleged that the tie provision in the lease was in violation of Article 85(1) 
and the entire lease was thereby illegal. 88 Inntrepreneur, on the other 
hand, argued that the lease did not infringe Article 85(1). Additionally, 
Inntrepreneur argued that even if the tie provision was not permissible 
under Article 85(1), the agreement was exempted under the Regulation 
1984/83,89 which dealt with exclusive purchase agreements, pursuant to 
Article 85(3). Inntrepreneur also opined that in the event the tie provision 
was invalid, it was excisable from the lease, which would leave the re-
mainder of the lease enforceable. 90 
Inntrepreneur also had applied to the Commission for an individual 
exemption for the lease in question, as well as all the leases. 91 The matter 
was still pending at the time of the initial legal action and had not been 
dealt with as of the date of this court's judgment. 92 
DG IV93 of the Commission, however, had sent Inntrepreneur two 
letters regarding its application for an individual exemption. The first let-
ter stated that, "the conditions of an individual retrospective exemption 
under Article 85(3) appear to be fultilled."94 The letter further stated that 
DG IV was "preparing, in conformity with the application of Article 
19(3) of Regulation No. 17, the publication of a summary of your notifi-
cation in order to invite all interested third parties to submit their obser-
vations to the Commission."95 A second letter indicated that since 
lnntrepreneur' s agreements were between undertakings from a single 
Member State, that they probably did not relate to imports and exports 
86. !d. at 296-97. 
87. !d. at 295. 
88. !d. at 297. 
89. See supra note 45. 
90. Inntrepreneur, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 297. 
91. !d. 
92. In July 1993, the Conunission indicated that it intended to grant the exemption but 
subject to a comment period. See [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 517. Subsequently, the Conunission 
announced that it would not "progress its current proceedings . . . pending the outcome of the 
simultaneously announced enquiry of the Office of Fair Trading into differential pricing by the 
major U.K. brewers." See [1995) 4 C.M.L.R. ANTITRUST REP. 310. 
93. DG IV is the Conunission's Directorate-General for competition. 
94. Jnntrepreneur, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 303, quoting a letter from Director General Rocca 
of DG IV. 
95. !d. 
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between Member States. 96 Inntrepreneur argued that these letters consti-
tuted comfort letters from the Commission. The Masons, however, main-
tained that they were not. 97 
In rendering judgment, Judge Michael Barnes relied on the Commis-
sion's Notice regarding the application of Articles 85 and 86 by national 
courts. He cited the specific directions given to national courts by the 
Commission that "[a]greements, decisions and concerted practices which 
fall within the scope of application of a block exemption regulation are 
automatically exempted from ... Article 85(1) without the need for a 
Commission or comfort letter. "98 
The court then outlined the procedures national courts should follow 
when dealing with agreements, decisions and concerted practices which 
are not covered by a block exemption regulation and which have not been 
the subject of an individual exemption decision or a comfort letter. It was 
noted that a national court should employ the following analysis in deter-
mining whether a block exemption applied: 
[1] Examine whether the procedural conditions necessary for securing 
an exemption are fulfilled .... Where ... no notification has been 
made ... the national court may decide ... that the agreement, decision 
or concerted practice is void. 
[2] Where the agreement, decision or concerted practice has been duly 
notified to the Commission, the national court will assess the likelihood 
of an exemption being granted ... 
[3] On the other hand, if it (the national court) takes the view that indi-
vidual exemption is possible, the national court should suspend the pro-
ceedings while awaiting the Commission's decision. 99 
In applying the Notice, Judge Barnes noted that there is a "substantial 
difference between the situation where a comfort letter has been issued 
and a situation where no such letter has been issued."100 In this case, the 
court observed that "a comfort letter is a letter issued after the procedure 
in the regulations has been gone through. . . . In the present case that 
stage has not been reached. "101 Therefore, the court found that the letters 
issued by DG IV, did not rise to the level of being comfort letters, as the 
Commission intended them only as the precursor to the initiation of an 
action pursuant to Regulation 17. 102 
96. /d. at 303-04. 
97. /d. at 297-98. 
98. !d. 
99. Jd. at 304, quoting the Commission's Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts 
and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, see supra note 5. 
100. Inntrepreneur, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 305. 
101. /d. 
102. Jd. 
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The court then addressed the question of how a national court should 
proceed in the absence of either a formal decision or a comfort letter. 
Judge Barnes found that this question must also be examined in light of 
the guidelines provided in the Notice. He stated that "the letters in ques-
tion can and should be taken into account notwithstanding that they do 
not have the formal status of comfort letters."103 He further commented 
that in an interlocutory proceeding such as Inntrepreneur, he was 
required to "form some estimate of the likelihood of an exemption actu-
ally emerging .... "104 Judge Barnes also noted, that it "is not entirely 
easy to know what comfort letters are .... It may be that what is intended 
by the [Commission's Notice] is that national courts are without further 
ado to treat comfort letters as being in their legal effect equivalent to a 
formal decision. "105 In final analysis, Judge Barnes held: 
First, the defendants (Masons) have a real prospect of success in show-
ing that the lease in this case is within Article 85(1) .... Second, the 
defendants have a real prospect of success in showing that the lease is 
not within the block exemption issued by the Commission under Article 
85(3) .... Third, I conclude that the defendants have a real prospect of 
success in showing that no individual exemption does or necessarily 
will apply to their lease. I reach that conclusion on the basis that the let-
ters issued are not comfort letters, but ... I would reach the same con-
clusion even were I wrong ... and the letters are properly to be regarded 
as comfort letters. 106 
In spite of these conclusions, the court granted ltmtrepreneur's ap-
peal.107 Judge Barnes noted that the Masons had demonstrated a legiti-
mate "prospect of success in showing that the tie provisions in the 
lease" 108 violated Article 85. However, he also found that the tie provi-
sions "should be excised from the lease ... leaving the remainder of the 
lease ... enforceable between the parties."109 Therefore, even though it 
was likely that the tie provisions violated EC competition laws, the Ma-
sons were still obligated under the lease. 
The court's holding in Inntrepreneur is actually incidental for the 
purpose of this comment. Rather, it is the High Court's application of 
103. !d. 
104. !d. at 306. 
!05. Inntrepreneur, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 306. 
106. !d. at 307. 
107. Interestingly, in a similar case involving Inntrepreneur' s tie provisions in a contract with 
another tenant, the English Court of Appeal cited and followed Judge Barnes decision. See 
Inntrepreneur Estates (GL) Ltd. v. Boyes, [1995] E.C.C. 16, available in 1996 LEXIS, INTLAW 
Library, ECCASE File. 
108. Inntrepreneur, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 319. 
109. !d. 
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Articles 85 and 86 that proves most important and also provides valuable 
insight into the national courts' reasoning on competition issues. In par-
ticular, Judge Barnes' analysis in Inntrepreneur helps to facilitate a better 
understanding of the national courts' application of EC competition law 
within the context of the Commission's Notice. Additionally, the case is 
an example of how the notion of subsidiarity may be implemented by na-
tional courts in competition law. However, it also underscores the 
problems and challenges that national courts face as a result of the imple-
mentation of subsidiarity principles. 
If the Commission intends for national courts to bear additional bur-
dens in the area of competition law, it must continue to expound andre-
11nc the parameters within which national courts may maneuver. The Com-
mission's Notice is certainly a step in the right direction. However, as 
Inntrepreneur illustrates, the Notice leaves gaps that eventually must be 
filled by the Commission. In the absence of EC clarification, national 
courts will be left to shape competition law on their own. Further clarifi-
cation will facilitate subsidiarity in the European Community and will 
alleviate some of the pressures on the Commission and the ECJ by allow-
ing additional actions to be brought in the national courts. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
Competition law in the EC will continue to expand and become 
clearer as the Commission deals with cases from the Member States. Fur-
thermore, with the inclusion of the concept of subsidiarity in the TEU, 
along with the guidelines provided by the Commission in its Notice, na-
tional courts are granted a greater role in the application and enforcement 
of Articles 85 and 86. National courts, much like the High Court in 
Inntrepreneur, will add to the body of decisions which makes up the 
competition law of the European Community. 
As previously mentioned, increased participation by national courts 
in applying and enforcing competition rules will alleviate many of the 
pressures on the EC institutions. However, this delegation of power also 
runs the risk of promoting inconsistent results in the respective Member 
States and throughout the EU. The Commission and the ECJ, therefore, 
will need to aggressively guide national courts. By so doing the EU will 
strengthen its ties with the Member States and will thereby fortify Euro-
pean integration and foster the free movement of goods and services in 
the internal market. 
Eric F. Hinton 
